In a pure-currency economy, money is the only durable object and people have private histories so that they cannot be punished individually in the future for current actions. In many such economies, trade is enhanced through the use of money and taxation is not feasible. For economies of that kind in which the distribution of money is a state variable, the conjecture is that there are transfer schemes …nanced by positive money creation that improve ex ante representative-agent welfare relative to what can be achieved holding the stock of money …xed.
Introduction
There are several models of outside money in which money creation accomplished by way of lump-sum transfers is optimal (see Levine [12] , Kehoe et. al. [8] , Molico [16] , Green and Zhou [6] , Deviatov [4] .) In those models, the transfers a¤ect extensive margins by altering the money holdings of those who trade in a way that can be bene…cial even though they lower the return on money. I suspect, however, that even economists familiar with this work view models in which money creation is bene…cial as quite special. My conjecture, on the contrary, is that money creation, although not necessarily produced by lump-sum transfers, is almost always optimal in pure-currency economies, where almost always includes the condition that the economy has signi…cant and endogenous heterogeneity of money holdings.
I am indebted to Wataru Nozawa and Hoonsik Yang for research assistance. y Penn State Department of Economics: <neilw@psu.edu> 2 Pure-currency economies: a mechanism-design point of view
The term pure currency is borrowed from Lucas [15] . Among his assumptions are: (i) outside money is the only store of value (the only durable object), and (ii) there is no borrowing and lending. Those assumptions, which also appear in many other models (see, for example, Bewley [2] ), are among those made to insure that there are equilibria with valued outside money. However, the two assumptions are very di¤erent: while (i) is about the environment, (ii) is not. The distinction is important because if we try to derive (ii) from assumptions about the environment as required by a mechanism-design approach, then those assumptions are likely to have implications for the feasibility of (policy) interventions.
Why take a mechanism-design approach? One reason is that a fundamental question in monetary theory is a mechanism-design question: what kinds of environments give rise to a role for money, or, in Frank Hahn's terminology, are such that money is essential ? The general result arising from a stream of research on this question is that imperfect monitoring (some departure from common knowledge of past actions) is necessary for essentiality of money (see, in particular, Ostroy [17] , Townsend [20] , Kocherlakota [9] , and Wallace [22] ). If there is common knowledge of past actions, then trigger strategies of the sort that show up in proofs of some versions of the folk-theorem can achieve any allocation that can be achieved with money. There are, however, no general results giving necessary and su¢ cient conditions for essentiality of money. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is a literature with extreme su¢ cient conditions: (iii) there is a large number of agents, often a nonatomic measure, each of whom discounts the future; and (iv) each agent has a private history (no monitoring). For me, a pure-currency economy is an environment with (i), (iii), (iv), and some sort of absence-of-double-coincidence. Obviously, (iv) implies (ii).
What sort of interventions are feasible in a pure-currency economy? As elaborated on below, taxation is not feasible in such economies. The feasible interventions are, at best, positive transfers in the form of money. Not incidentally, Lucas called his economy a pure currency economy, as opposed to a pure money economy. My guess is that he did so because the money in the model is best identi…ed with (outside) currency. Other familiar payment instruments that are sometimes labeled money, including promises of various kinds, rely on informational networks that are not consistent with (iv) or (ii). It is also pertinent to recall that currency usage in actual economies is often associated with tax evasion and with underground activities. Indeed, a pure-currency economy should be regarded as an extreme kind of underground economy.
The conjecture
I describe the conjecture against the background of a class of discrete-time purecurrency economies which lend themselves to an ex ante representative-agent notion of welfare. The economies have in…nitely-lived agents who maximize expected discounted utility. The state of the economy at date-t is a joint distribution over types and money holdings, denoted t . Then shocks are realized, including, possibly, aggregate shocks. There are two stages of actions. The …rst stage has trade. In some models, trade is centralized as in Lucas [15] , Bewley [2] , and Levine [12] ; in others, it occurs in pairwise meetings between agents as in Trejos and Wright [21] . The second stage is solely for transfers from the planner. If a person has money holdings m 2 R + after trade at date t, then the post-transfer holding is m + t (m), where t : R + ! R + and is weakly increasing. As spelled out below, the restriction that (m) 0 is implied by no monitoring; the restriction that is weakly increasing assures that people do not want to hide money at the transfer stage. I also assume that money is a uniform divisible object.
For my purposes, it is enough to focus on the following class of two-parameter transfer functions:
Notice that if a t = 0, then the transfers are proportional to holdings. Such transfers are known to be neutral and, therefore, are equivalent to no-intervention, a …xed stock of money. It follows immediately that a scheme with a t > 0 is equivalent to lump-sum transfers because it is a combination of a lump-sum transfer equal to a t and a proportional scheme. In what follows, schemes with a t > 0 are called progressive schemes because they shift wealth away from the wealthy, while those with a t < 0 are called regressive schemes because they shift wealth toward the wealthy. Schemes with a t < 0 give positive transfers only to those with holdings larger than a t =b t . 1 As we will see, regressive schemes bear some resemblance to lump-sum tax schemes in terms of their consequences. As regards the ex ante representative-agent notion of welfare, assume that agents are identical before the initial distribution over types and money holding, denoted 0 , is realized. Then ex ante welfare is date-0 expected discounted utility, where the expectation is taken with respect to 0 .
In order to state the conjecture, it is helpful to set out schematically a law of motion, t+1 = H( t ; " t ; trade t ; t );
where " t denotes realized shocks and where the third argument is a speci…cation of trades (at the …rst stage). It is also helpful to have a de…nition of …rst-best.
Given an environment, I mean by …rst-best what is best if no monitoring is replaced by perfect monitoring. (Throughout, I assume that agents, in contrast to the planner, cannot commit to future actions and, therefore, that …rst-best is subject to that inability to commit.) Now I can state some assumptions. A1. (Signi…cant and endogenous heterogeneity of money holdings) The marginal distribution of t+1 over money holdings helps determine future real outcomes (in particular, the feasible trades at t + 1) and is itself a¤ected both by the trades at t and the transfers at t.
A2. (Interiority) The best no-intervention outcome ( t 0) has valuable money and is not …rst best.
A3. (Defection) Trades are both individually rational (IR) and subject to static group defection, but transfers are subject only to IR. Now I can state the conjecture.
Conjecture 1 If a pure-currency economy satis…es A1-A3, then generically the best outcome has nonneutral intervention (a t 6 = 0) at almost every date.
Before I say why the conjecture is plausible, some comments are in order about assumptions A1-A3. There are well-known models that do not satisfy A1. Any model in which money holdings are the same for all agents does not satisfy A1. These include Shi [19] in which any dispersion in money holdings is wiped out by sharing within a so-called large family and Lagos and Wright [11] in which any such dispersion is wiped out by a stage of centralized trade with quasi-linear preferences. Another model which violates A1 is the randommatching model of Shi [18] and Trejos-Wright [21] in which money is discrete and individual holdings are in f0; 1g. There, because trades necessarily have buyers and sellers switching money holdings, the distribution, although nondegenerate, is not a¤ected by trades. Needless to say, all the exceptions are very special models for which conformity to A1 is produced by obvious generalizations. As regards A2, although there are models in which a …xed stock of money gives rise to a …rst-best allocation, that seems to happen only in models which also violate A1 (see, for example, Hu et. al. [7] ) or seem to violate static group defection (see Kocherlakota [10] Although the conjecture is weak, I do not have a proof. The ingredients of an argument would seem to be standard and are reminiscent of so-called secondbest theory (see Lipsey and Lancaster [14] ). Consider a policy fa t ; b t g 1 t=0 with a t 0 and b t > 0 for all t. By neutrality, this is the same as no-intervention. Now, for any date t and with b t > 0 …xed, consider an neighborhood around 0 for a t . This is an open set around no-intervention at date t. By A1 and A2, there ought to be a policy with a t 6 = 0 that increases ex ante welfare except in special cases. In particular, absent intervention, the trades at t are doing double duty: they must be a compromise between those which are best for production and consumption at t and those which are geared solely toward producing a desirable distribution of money holdings entering the next date. Nonneutral transfers represent additional instruments. Generically, they ought to be helpful.
Examples
I discuss two kinds of examples, one with centralized trade and one with pairwise meetings. The centralized-trade example is one for which a version of the conjecture can be veri…ed for a particular speci…cation. The second example is the kind of model within which I …rst thought about the conjecture. It does not lend itself to any simple demonstration of its validity. For it, even verifying A1 and A2 is challenging.
Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford
Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford (KLW) [8] generalizes Levine [12] and can be regarded as a special case of Bewley [2] . The economy is an exchange economy with one good per discrete date, a unit measure of people. Each person maximizes expected discounted utility of consumption with discount factor 2 (0; 1) and period utility function u : R ++ ! R, where u is twice di¤erentiable over the relevant part of the domain and u 00 < 0 < u 0 . There are two possible endowment patterns at each date: in one of them, each of one-half of the people has endowment y h and each of the remaining half has endowment y l ; in the other the reverse is the case. Here, y h > y l > 0. Let 2 [0; 1] be the probability that the pattern switches. The initial condition is that each pattern is equally likely. Let y = (y h + y l )=2. Also, trade is price-taking spot trade of the good for money subject to the sequence of ‡ow budget constraints,
where c t is date-t consumption, p t is the date-t price of money, and x t 0 is the amount of money acquired at the trade stage at date-t.
KLW analyze special cases for which there are equilibria in which those who realized the high endowment at t 1 hold all the money at the end of the trade stage at t 1. They call such equilibria two-state Markov equilibrium. They also assume that money is distributed initially in that way. Their policies are equal per capita lump-sum transfers or taxes. For some versions of their model, they show that the best policy in their class is a lump-sum transfer. One such example is u(x) = minfln x; ug (where u > ln y h assures that transversality conditions hold, but plays no other role); = = 1=2; and y h =y l = 10 (see [8] , page 520). I will use their model for two purposes. First, for the special case = 1, I will construct the best constant allocation and show that it can be supported by a constant-in ‡ation regressive scheme from the class above. That result illustrates in a very simple way the bene…cial role of regressive schemes. (It is well-known that progressive schemes reduce welfare when = 1.) Then, I will study constant-in ‡ation intervention schemes for the above particular example (but without setting ). In that example, a two-state valued-money Markov equilibrium with no intervention exists for all 2 (1=9; 1] (see condition (6.4) on page 519 of [8] ).
The special case = 1.
Let s be the unique solution to
where, in accord with assumption A2, I assume that s is positive. (That is, the best constant no-intervention outcome has valued money.) Notice that s is the goods value of money acquired by each y h person with all money transferred at each date from y l people to y h people.
The …rst-best constant allocation is constructed as follows. Let s be the unique positive solution to
and letŝ = minfs ; y
Clearly, (ĉ h ;ĉ l ) gives higher ex ante utility than that implied by (4 The proof (see the appendix) is a guess-and-verify argument. The idea is to construct a transfer scheme so that the two-date opportunity set for people with y t = y h given that they enter date t and date t + 2 makes (ĉ h ;ĉ l ) an optimal choice. Once that is done, the rest of the argument is familiar.
4.1.2
The special case u(x) = minfln x; ug, = 1=2, y h =y l = 10, and 2 (1=9; 1)
For this example, I study a class of constant-in ‡ation intervention schemes. The class consists of the above two-parameter policies with b t = b > 0 and with a constant growth rate of the stock of money, = (m t+1 m t )=m t , where m t denotes the per capita stock of money just before transfers at t.
If those with y t = y l end the trade-stage with no money and those with y t = y h end with 2m t (as required for a two-state Markov equilibrium), then the implied law of motion for m t is
It follows that
Notice that a t =a t 1 = 1 + . Also, a t =m t , and, hence, ex ante welfare, is not di¤erentiable at = b. We …x b > 0 and study ex ante welfare as a function of for near b, where = b is the same as no-intervention. 
That is, a regressive scheme, one with < b, always produces a local improvement; while a progressive scheme produces a local improvement for < :74.
As for claim 1, the proof, which appears in the appendix, is a guess and verify argument. Let 2 f0; 1g denote the state at a date, where 0 at date-t means that the high-endowment people at t had the high endowment at t 1 (no switch at t) while 1 at date-t means that the high endowment people at t had the low endowment at t 1 (a switch at t). The guess that there is a valued money, two-state Markov equilibrium implies one pair of simultaneous equations for the two-date saving decision for high-endowment people when b and another pair when b. The …rst pair allows us to derive an expression for W 0 + (b) and the second pair an expression for W 0 (b).
The claim says that a regressive scheme is always locally improving. To see why that is true, let c l ( ; ) be equilibrium consumption of a low endow- . This source of gain is the same as occurs in the = 1 economy and is a consequence of low-endowment people being at a corner.
The result for progressive schemes is essentially in [8] .
:74 is a cut-o¤ that determines when the net e¤ect is a welfare gain.
Because the source of a gain for regressive and progressive schemes is very di¤erent (one a¤ects c l (1; ) favorably and the other a¤ects c l + (0; ) favorably), it can happen that both kinds of schemes are locally improving. That happens for 2 (1=9; :74) and says that no-intervention is a local minimum for such 's.
The above follows KLW in studying a class of constant interventions. Of course, even if there exists a no-intervention, two-state Markov equilibrium, that does not imply that the best intervention scheme is a constant scheme. Nevertheless, the study of constant schemes su¢ ces to prove for this example that never intervening (a t 0) is not best. 4 
Trejos-Wright with divisible money
Trejos and Wright [21] (see also Shi [18] ) is a pure-currency economy with random pairwise meetings. Time is discrete and there is a nonatomic unit measure of people, each of whom maximizes expected discounted utility with discount factor 2 (0; 1). Production and consumption occur in pairwise meetings that occur at random in the following way. Just prior to such meetings, each person looks forward to being a consumer who meets a random producer with probability 1=K, looks forward to being a producer who meets a random consumer with probability 1=K, and looks forward to no pairwise meeting with probability 1 (2=K), where K, an integer, exceeds two. The period utility of someone who becomes a consumer and consumes y 2 R + is u(y), where u is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and u(0) = 0. The period utility of someone who becomes 4 In a variant of the KLW model that does not have two-state Markov equilibria, Lippi and Tracter [13] study optimal lump-sum tax policy, while permitting intervention to be a function of the proportion of money held by their analogue of low-endowment people. Their computed optima have lump-sum transfers at some dates and lump-sum taxes at other dates. A plausible conjecture is that if interventions are limited to my class of two-parameter transfer schemes, then the optimum in their example would have progressive transfers at some dates and regressive transfers at other dates. a producer and produces y 2 R + is c(y), where c is strictly increasing, convex, and c(0) = 0. In addition, y = arg max y 0 [u(y) c(y)] exists and is positive. Production is perishable; it is either consumed or lost. 5 Each person's trading history is private information and each person's money holding is in [0; 1). As described below, we can consider versions in which people in meetings can hide money and versions in which they cannot.
The state of the economy at t is a measure, denoted t , over money holdings prior to meetings. Trade in a meeting is denoted f t (m;
where m (m 0 ) is the producer's (consumer's) money prior to trade, and the …rst component is output (production and consumption), and the second is the money transferred from the consumer to the producer. Transfers from the planner are as above. A symmetric allocation is a sequence f t ; f t ; t g 1 t=0 . One condition for implementability is that the sequence satisfy the implied version of the law of motion, (2) .
What determines f t ? In models of centralized trade, trade is determined by the condition that it be immune to static group defection. When people meet in pairs, possible defection by the pair in the meeting does not determine trades. And, now, it matters greatly whether people in a meeting can hide money. If they cannot hide money, then the pairwise core is well de…ned for a given continuation value of money, and is the IR segment of the implied contract curve. Trades can be any mapping from money holdings to the IR segment of the contract curve. If people can hide money, then de…ning cooperative defection by the pair in a meeting is problematic.
The validity of A1 and A2 in such a model is not obvious. A1 almost certainly holds. As regards A2, we know that the …rst best cannot be achieved. Let v(y) = [u(y) c(y)]=K(1 ), the ex ante discounted expected utility if y 2 R + is output in every single-coincidence meeting. If c(y ) v(y ), output equal to y in every single-coincidence is …rst best, where the inequality assures that y = y is consistent with no commitment. However, no constant and positive y produced in all meetings is consistent with valued money (see Wallace [22] ). The other part of A2 is that monetary trade is implementable. That is not so obvious. Zhu [24] shows that if there is a bound on individual holdings, then consumer (buyer) take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers give rise to a steady state with valuable money. 6 If the conjecture could be adapted to be consistent with bounded holdings, then that would su¢ ce for satisfaction of A2. Of course, con…rming A1 and A2 is not a proof of the conjecture for this model. Some existing results hint that it is true. Molico [16] provides examples of steady states in which progressive schemes improve ex ante welfare under consumer take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. That leaves open whether they would also be optimal if trades were chosen optimally subject to static group-defection. Deviatov [4] studies a version with individual holdings con…ned to f0; 1; 2g, no hiding of money, and considers all trades consistent with pairwise defection. He …nds some examples in which a probabilistic approximation to a progressive scheme is welfare improving and others in which it is not. He does not study regressive schemes and his upper bound on individual money holdings may be too low to give scope to regressive schemes.
Concluding remarks
The conjecture is weak in that it says only that some intervention is bene…cial. Can we hope for stronger conclusions-perhaps, a characterization of when an improvement comes from a small progessive scheme and when it comes from a small regressive scheme? I think not. In order to give money a role, the environment has to have enough imperfect monitoring and discounting to prevent the folk theorem from holding. Although uncertainty is not necessary for essentiality of money, any general model will have both uncertainty and risk-averse people. When that is the case, the assumptions that make money essential inhibit bene…cial risk-sharing. A consequence is that the optimum depends on details of the model because progressive schemes tend to improve risk-sharing while regressive schemes tend to raise the return on money in line with the Friedman-rule recommendation.
One of the least palatable assumptions I made is that groups cannot exploit the transfers. If they could, then regressive schemes cannot be implemented. If we permit (static) group defection at the transfer stage, then we would have to …nd alternatives that resemble regressive schemes. One possibility is that the planner o¤ers a variety of securities, di¤erent kinds of government bonds, which are in denominations that prevent them from being shared when purchased. If the returns are …nanced by money creation, then such schemes should approximate regressive schemes.
Of course, pure-currency economies are extreme economies. The obvious way to depart from such special cases is to weaken the assumption that individual histories are private, but not in so extreme a way as to eliminate a role for money. In such economies, some forms of both credit and taxation become feasible. While there is no general result concerning the optimality of money creation in such models, Deviatov and Wallace [5] show in an example based on Cavalcanti and Wallace [3] that it can be optimal in such settings. Moreover, the source of optimality is consistent with the roles of assumptions A1 and A2 discussed above.
Appendix

Proof of claim 1
The conjectured supporting transfer scheme has t (x t ) = maxf0; a t +b t x t g with
where
Notice that 0 < 1 < 1 . Moreover, we guess that prices satisfy p t+1 =p t = 0 and 2p t m t = y h ĉ h , and that choices satisfy
where, as above, m t is the pre-transfer per capita stock of money at date t. Notice, also, that the two equations in (8) and (10) imply a sequence for a t . In particular, we have
Then, using, 2p t m t = y h ĉ h , we have
We show that when people face the above conjectured prices and transfers, the conjectured choices for p t x t are maximizing. There are two parts to showing conjecture set out here.
this. First, we show that (10) satis…es the relevant Euler inequalties. Then, there is an additional step because people are in…nitely lived.
(i) Satisfaction of the Euler equation when y t = y h for the conjectured prices and transfers. By the ‡ow budget constraint at equality (see (3)) and x t 1 = x t+1 = 0,
Therefore,
where, by (11),
Now, we are ready to con…rm that (c t ; c t+1 ) = (ĉ h ;ĉ l ) satis…es the Euler equation. First, consider the upper branch of (12) . The feasible choices are a subset of those that satisfy c t+1 = y l + 0 (y h c t ). But, by the de…nition of 0 , it follows that the best choice along the upper branch is (c t ; c t+1 ) = (y h ; y l ).
Next, consider the lower branch. First, we show that (c t ; c t+1 ) = (ĉ h ;ĉ l ) is a feasible choice. By (13) ,
And, again by (13), (c t ; c t+1 ) = (ĉ h ;ĉ l ) satis…es c t+1 = y l + 1 (y h c t ) + 0 p t a t . Thus, (c t ; c t+1 ) = (ĉ h ;ĉ l ) is a feasible choice along the lower branch of (12) .
And, by the de…nition of 1 , it is best from among choices along the lower branch of (12) . Finally, by construction of (ĉ h ;ĉ l ), it is weakly preferred to (y h ; y l ). Hence, (c t ; c t+1 ) = (ĉ h ;ĉ l ) satis…es the Euler equation when y t = y h .
(ii) Satisfaction of the Euler inequality when y t = y l .
Now we set x t 1 = 2m t 1 and x t+1 = 2m t+1 and have to show that the best choice is x t = 0. This follows from 1 1= and 2m t p t = y (iii) Su¢ ciency of (i) and (ii) for individual maximization. One proof proceeds by grouping adjoining pairs of dates (see the appendix to Wallace [23] ).
Proof of claim 2
Let 2 f0; 1g denote the state at a date, where 0 at date t means that the high endowment people at t had the high endowment at t 1 (no switch at t) and 1 at date t means that the high endowment people at t had the low endowment at t 1 (a switch at t). We proceed by guess and verify. One part of our guess is that if = 0, then the high endowment people at t had all the money at the end of the trade stage at t 1 and if = 1 at date t, then the high endowment people at t had no money at the end of the trade stage at t 1.
The ‡ow budget constraint, (3), at equality is
As part of our guess, we suppose that
and that
A consequence of (6) and (16) is
and
where is the state at t and 0 is the state at t + 1.
We solve for (z 0 ; z 1 ) 2 R 2 ++ from the Euler equations at equality for the high endowment people. (For in the neighborhood of b, the con…rmation that the low-endowment people leave the trade stage with no money for this example is a consequence of the same result in KLW [8] , [see page 520].) There are now two Euler equations for the high endowment people, one for each current state. Moreover, we get di¤erent equations for each branch for in (17) .
(i) The Euler equations for y t = y h when = 0.
We get the relevant Euler equations by imposing our guess for x t+1 and for x t 1 and by studying the best choice for p t x t z. By (14) for date t + 1 and our guess for x t+1 and for x t 1 , we have
where the …rst holds if 0 = 0 and the second if 0 = 1. Then by (17) and (18),
and c l t+1 = 8 > < > :
By (14) for date-t, = 0, and our guess that x t 1 = 2m t 1 = 2m t =(1 + ), we have by way of (15)- (18) and a t 1 =a t = 1=(1 + ),
The objective from which we get the Euler equations is
where H 
For u(c) = ln c, both …rst-order conditions have the form
That is, along each branch for , (25) with the relevant substitutions for (c (ii) The Euler equations for y t = y h when = 1.
Again, there are two next-period states and (19) and (20) hold. But in place of (21) and (22), we have
and c l t+1 =
<
:
or, using (17) ,
By ( ) is expressed as a function of the choice variable z. In particular, the objective from which we get the Euler equation is
For u(c) = ln c, the …rst-order conditions have the form
where (26)- (28); namely, 
Notice that for in the neighborhood of b, is near . Equation 
Therefore, it su¢ ces to study
where F is de…ned and continuous for (z 1 ; ) 2 (0; y h ) (b "; b + "). First, because lim z 1 !y h h(z 1 ; ) = 1, it follows that F (z 1 ; ) > 0 for z 1 near y h .
Also, because lim z 1 !0 h(z 1 ; ) = lim z 1 !0 g(z 1 ; ), lim z 1 !0 h 1 (z 1 ; ) < 0 (this uses = 1=2, y h =y l = 10, and 1=2), and lim z 1 !0 g 1 (z 1 ; ) > 0, it follows that F (z 1 ; ) < 0 for z 1 near 0. Therefore, the intermediate-value theorem implies existence ofẑ 1 ( ) > 0 such that F (ẑ 1 ( ); ) = 0. Uniqueness is implied by g 11 (z 1 ; ) < 0 and h 11 (z 1 ; ) > 0. And, we letẑ 0 ( ) = g(ẑ 1 ( ); ) and let z ( ) = (ẑ 0 ( );ẑ 1 ( )).
Althoughẑ ( ) is interpretable in terms of the model only for b, F is well de…ned for in the neighborhood of b. Moreover, F is di¤erentiable in both its arguments at = b. That allows us to apply the implicit function to F and to conclude that the left-hand derivative ofẑ 1 ( ) at = b is given by
Therefore, from (39)- (41),
with all derivatives evaluted at (z 1 ; ) = (ẑ 1 (b); b). With all the above derivatives in hand, we can complete the argument. Using
